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UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO SELL
PRODUCTION FACILITIES: SHOULD
COURTS "SHAKE" THE INVISIBLE HAND?
"A wise man never refuses anything to necessity."*

INTRODUCTION

A unilateral refusal to deal is an independent decision of an individual person or company not to sell goods, services, or production
facilities to one or more customers or competitors.' Generally, a
company may unilaterally refuse to deal with a party for any reason,
absent a "purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" 2 in violation of
Publilius Syrus, Maxim 540.
1. 16 G. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 61.01 (1980).

Included under the rubric of refusals to deal are absolute refusals as well as refusals
to do business on any except relatively unfavorable terms. Barber, Refusals to Deal
Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 847, 847 n.1 (1955). A concerted refusal to deal or group boycott is a refusal to deal that is initiated and enforced pursuant to an agreement of two or more firms. See Hampton, Hibner, Jr. &
Varner, Horizontal Restraints of Trade-The Sherman Act in Antitrust Adviser §
1.32, at 34-36 (2d ed. C. Hills 1971). Although the two terms are used interchangeably, Professor Sullivan defines a boycott as a concerted refusal to deal "aimed at
depriving competitors of some needed resource," which is per se illegal. He would
evaluate all other concerted refusals according to their net impact on competitive
conditions, a rule of reason. L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 90, at
256 (1977). A concerted refusal to deal is more likely to be condemned under the
antitrust laws than a unilateral one, even when both are aimed at achieving the same
result. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 839 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 963 (1961). "[T]he distinction between unilateral and collaborative or conspiratorial action... reflects a philosophy that exalts the liberty, and initiative of the
individual enterprise and looks with suspicion on collective action. The latter is inherently dangerous because it represents aggregations of power that are likely to be
used in a manner detrimental to the public interest." Fulda, Individual Refusals to
Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 590, 603 (1965).
2. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). Unlawful unilateral refusals to deal may be distinguished according to the particular monopolistic
goals they seek to achieve. For example, the refusal to deal can be employed by a
monopolist in one market to distort or destroy competition in another market. Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Six Twenty-Nine Prod., Inc. v. Rollins
Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966). A monopolist can refuse to deal with
customers who deal with rivals. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951). A company that controls a facility that cannot be easily duplicated can deny
access to the faciity to other firms. United States v.Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383
(1912), modified and aff'd, 236 U.S. 194 (1915); cf., Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co.,
199 U.S. 279 (1905) (exclusion of noncompeting firm is not monopolization). A company can utilize a refusal to deal in conjunction with other coercive conduct to enforce an anticompetitive arrangement such as resale price maintenance, tying agreements, or exclusive dealing contracts. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th
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section 2 of the Sherman Act.' Refusals to sell goods and services
must be distinguished from refusals to sell production facilities because the potential harm of each is significantly different. The sale of
goods and services often entails an ongoing series of transactions.' A
distributor who depends on a particular manufacturer to supply all or
part of its requirements, for example, will place another order with
the manufacturer each time its stock is depleted. The refusing company, therefore, may use a refusal to deal to monopolize or unreasonably restrain trade.' Because the sale of production facilities involves
a single transaction, however, it is less clear that this type of refusal
will have a significant anticompetitive effect. Indeed, because enjoining a refusal to sell production facilities may unreasonably restrict the
transfer of resources, 7 there may be greater harm to the economy
from condemning such a refusal than deferring to the refusing firm's
independent business judgment. Thus, it is necessary to examine the
economic consequences of a refusal when analyzing production facility
cases.
Because few cases have addressed the issue of the legality of unilateral refusals to sell production facilities, there is little precedent to
guide the courts in making their decisions. The question is likely to
be increasingly contested, however, as companies seek to contract
their operations in declining American industries such as automobiles

Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832

(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
4. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359,
374 (1927); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 303 (1919).
5. See McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594, 596-97
(6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Transammonia Export Corp. v. Conserv Inc., 554 F.2d 719, 720 (5th Cir. 1977); HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp.,
365 F.2d 77, 79 (3d Cir. 1966); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470
F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp.,
397 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); International Envt'l Corp. v. ITr Corp., 397
F. Supp. 253, 254 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
6. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1973);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1927);
General Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 1232 (5th Cir. 1980);
Fray Chevrolet Sales, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 536 F.2d 683, 684 (6th Cir.

1976).
7. Competitive markets may be maintained by ensuring that resources may be
transferred to their most productive employments. D. Needham, Economic Analysis
and Industrial Structure 138 (1969); F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance 9, 18 (1970); A. Smith, Wealth of Nations 99, 125-26, 134
(Cannan ed. 1937); accord L. Weiss, Case Studies in American Industry 10 (3d ed.
1980). Furthermore, the theory of comparative advantage holds that allocative efficiency is maximized by transferring resources to those industries that have a comparative cost advantage. Id. at 212-13.
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and steel.8 This Note examines unilateral refusals to sell production
facilities according to established legal standards and economic
theory. It concludes that a company should have an unfettered right
to refuse to sell its production facilities unless the refusal is part of a
course of conduct calculated to distort or destroy competition.
I.

UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO SELL GOODS AND SERVICES:

THE SCOPE OF A PERMISSIBLE REFUSAL
UNDER THE SHERMAN

ACT

Most contested unilateral refusals to deal have involved refusals to
sell goods to customers. 9 In United States v. Colgate & Co.,"0 the
defendant manufacturer refused to sell its products to dealers who
would not adhere to its fixed resale prices." The Government
alleged that Colgate's resale price maintenance scheme violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade.' 2 Although the Supreme Court
rejected the Government's contention because there was no evidence
of an agreement between Colgate and the dealers," the Court
announced a broad rule upholding the right of a firm to decide independently with whom it will deal. The Court wrote that

[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with

whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance
the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell."
Thus, a unilateral refusal to deal is lawful unless it violates section 2

of the Sherman Act, which prohibits persons from monopolizing or
attempting to monopolize any part of interstate commerce."3

Because

8. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1981, § 3, at 18, col. 3; id., Dec. 11, 1980, § A, at
34, col. 1.
9. E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); General Chems.,
Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1980); H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock
of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1963).
10. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
11. Id. at 304-05.
12. Id. at 302-03.
13. Id. at 305-07.
14. Id. at 307.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States."
Id.; see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Times-Pacayune
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a unilateral refusal to deal, by definition, precludes concerted action,
it is not prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act."&
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). A few cases involve concerted refusals to deal that defendants unsuccessfully attempted to characterize as unilateral. E.g., Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). Unilateral refusals to
deal have been challenged under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976),
as discriminations "in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality." The challenges were unsuccessful because § 2(a) applies only to
completed transactions. Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1939); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
A monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal was recently challenged in Official Airlines
Guides, Inc. v. FTC, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,544 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1980),
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976), which
prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition in ... commerce." The FTC claimed that
a monopolist publisher of flight schedules violated § 5 by providing schedules to
certain airline carriers while refusing the same to commuter airlines. The Second
Circuit upheld the monopolist's arbitrary refusal as permissible under Colgate, noting
that a contrary result "would give the FTC too much power to substitute its own
business judgment for that of the monopolist in any decision that arguably affects
competition in another industry." [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,544, at 76,919
(citation omitted).
16. The Court considered when a firm's conduct would go beyond a simple refusal to deal and become a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960). To insure compliance at the retail level, Parke, Davis induced
wholesale distributors to discontinue sales to retailers who refused to adhere to Its
resale prices. Id. at 33. The Court held that Parke, Davis's use of wholesalers to
enforce its resale price maintenance scheme on retailers constituted an unlawful combination in restraint of trade prohibited by § 1. Id. at 47. Thus, according to Parke,
Davis, a company's conduct is unilateral if it consists of a mere, independent
announcement of policy and a refusal to sell. Id. at 44. Any attempt to enforce an
anticompetitive policy with the aid of other parties in addition to a simple refusal to
deal, elevates the firm's conduct to a restraint of trade that violates § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id., see Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964);
Carr Elecs. Corp. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 472 F. Supp. 9, 11 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Pearl
Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). If a contested refusal to deal is deemed unilateral, as defined by the Supreme
Court in Parke, Davis, the legality of the refusal is then evaluated under the principle expressed in Colgate. See Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel.
and Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980); Clairol,
Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1979);
Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1977); Reed
Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055
(1976); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Fontana Aviation,
Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
923 (1971); Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636 (D. Md. 1979);
Natrona Serv. Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 435 F. Supp. 99 (D. Wyo. 1977); Paddington Corp. v. Major Brands, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 1244 (W. D. Okla. 1973); Kendall
Elevator Co. v. LBC&W Assocs., 350 F. Supp. 75 (D.S.C. 1972); Carbon Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Arzee
Supply Corp. v. Ruberoid Co., 222 F. Supp. 237 (D. Conn. 1963).
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A unilateral refusal to deal can be characterized as an act of unlawful monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act." To establish unlawful monopolization, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's
possession of monopoly power'8 in the relevant market' and the defendant's "willful acquisition or maintenance of that power."-" A defendant's purpose may be inferred from circumstances surrounding its
refusal to deal. 21 For example, a monopolist manufacturer's refusal to
deal that follows an unsuccessful attempt to purchase the plaintiff's
retail business after acquiring other, competing retail dealerships has
been held to manifest " 'an intention and desire to perpetuate a
monopoly.' -2'
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
18. Monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition."

United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 26 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beck-man Instruments,
Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 276 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); American
Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp. 487 F. Supp. 265, 269 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Dart
Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 n.8 (D. Md. 1979);
Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd, 595 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979).
19. The relevant market is comprised of a product and geographic market. See A.
Austin, Antitrust: Law, Economics, Policy § 2.3 (1976).
20. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Mid-Texas
Communications Sys. Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1385-86

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v.
IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979); Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass
Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D. Md. 1979); Schaben v. Samuel Moore and Co.,
462 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff'd, 606 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1979);
Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762, 771 (N.D. Ohio 1976),
aff'd, 590 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1978). Courts require proof of general intent to monopolize, consciousness of the natural and likely consequence of a defendant's conduct.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
21. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927); CaseSwayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 459 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967); Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708, 709 (3d Cir. 1958).
22. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375

(1927) (citation omitted). In Kodak, plaintiff, a photographic supply store, had purchased goods from Kodak, a monopolist manufacturer of photographic materials, on
the same terms made available to other dealers. After acquiring control of several
competing supply stores, Kodak made an unsuccessful attempt to purchase the
plaintiff's business. Shortly thereafter, Kodak refused to sell supplies to the plaintiff
at dealer prices. The plaintiff was able to obtain the supplies from Kodak only at the
prices at which Kodak's newly acquired dealers sold to consumers. Plaintiff, therefore, was effectively unable to compete with the other dealers. One commentator has
disagreed with the Supreme Court's finding that Kodak's refusal to deal evinced a
monopolistic purpose. "Kodak's offer to buy out its second-level competitors [should
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Unlawful monopolization has also been found when a firm with a
bottleneck monopoly in one market refuses to deal with competing
firms in another market.13 A bottleneck monopoly is one lawfully
obtained from possession of some scarce resource or facility, such as a
transportation terminal or power transmission line, that cannot easily
or economically be obtained or duplicated by competitors. 4 When a
bottleneck monopolist begins to operate in the markets of its suppliers or customers, its refusal to sell to competitors who are also
customers or suppliers in the other markets enables it to eliminate
those competitors.2' A refusal to sell under these circumstances is,
therefore, deemed to be aimed solely at the maintenance or creation
of a monopoly in those markets. Equal access to the monopoly market on fair terms is generally required.26
When the unilateral refusal is intended to create a monopoly,
rather than to maintain one, it can be challenged under section 2 as
an attempt to monopolize a relevant market.27 A proper cause of
action for attempt requires that the plaintiff allege a specific intent to

not] have been considered sufficient evidence that either the purposes or the consequences of the defendant's refusal to deal were impermissible. Since such bids
help lower the costs of market exit, they are fully consistent with the policies of a
rational monopolist who desires the most efficient operation at the second level. Indeed, in light of the natural effect of a refusal, a failure to offer to buy out a former
distributor at a reasonable price might have been more indicative of a desire to harm
a competitor and discourage subsequent entry." Note. Refusals to Deal by Vertically
Integrated Monopolists, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1720, 1733-34 (1974) (footnotes omitted)

[hereinafter cited as Vertically Integrated Monopolists].
23. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Otter Tail produced electric power and sold it to 465 towns in three states, transmitting electricity
through its own lines. In many areas of Otter's territory, these were the only transmission lines available (Otter's bottleneck monopoly). Otter Tail provided power pursuant to municipally granted franchises for a fixed term. Upon expiration of these
franchises, various towns sought to replace Otter with municipal systems. Otter refused to sell power at wholesale to municipal systems and refused to transfer power
of other wholesalers over its transmission lines to the municipalities. Those towns
that did not have access to other transmission facilities were, therefore, forced to
renew Otter Tail's retail franchise. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Otter's refusals to deal were aimed solely at the
maintenance of its retail monopolies. Id. at 378.
24. See A. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A. 66 (2d ed. 1970).

25. Vertically Integrated Monopolists, supra note 22, at 1722.
26. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979); see Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (197.3); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. 383 (1912),
modified and aff'd, 236 U.S. 194 (1915); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972);
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg. Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); see note 19 supra.
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monopolize 2s and a dangerous probability of success.- The specific
intent element focuses on the impact of the defendant's conduct on
competitive conditions.3 0 The defendant's state of mind is
irrelevant. 3' Thus, a defendant may be held to have a specific intent
to monopolize when its refusal to deal has an unreasonably anticompetitive effect on the market.? Specific intent may be inferred from
28. Specific intent has been defined as an "'intent to destroy competition or build
monopoly." Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626
(1953). See note 20 supra for an explanation of general intent.
29. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). In Swift, Justice Holmes
wrote that "[w]here acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which
the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in
addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it
to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it %%ill happen."
Id. at 396; see Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153
(1951); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Ernest W. Halm, Inc. v.
Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 1980); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo
Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1979); White Bag Co. v. International
Paper Co., 579 F.2d 1384, 1387 (4th Cir. 1974); Structure Probe, Inc. v. Franklin
Inst., 450 F. Supp. 1272, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979);
L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 50, at 134. See generally, Cooper, Attempts and Monop-

olization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two,
72 Mich. L. Rev. 373 (1974); Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1121 (1973). Only the Ninth
Circuit has eliminated the dangerous probability requirement. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1954). But cf.,
Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1977) (dangerous probability of success is an element of attempted monopolization unless there is
proof of specific intent and predatory conduct), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972) (rejection of dangerous
probability requirement only when attempted monopolization claim founded on a
substantial claim of restraint of trade).
30. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo.
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). cert. denied. 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977).
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers Inc., 293 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1961); Hawk, supra note 29, at 1171-72.
31. See note 30 supra.
32. H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1963).
"'[S]ome appreciable part' " of the market must be adversely affected by the refusal.
Id. (appreciable part not affected when defendant's refusal to fabricate granite prevented plaintiff from supplying granite for the construction of a single building); see
Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Corp., 339 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1965)
(advertising agency's refusal to accept Yellow Pages ads from another agency in one
section of Illinois did not constitute illegal monopolization or attempt to monopolize
when there were a number of classified directories throughout Illinois). See also
United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S.
1043 (1980); Santa Fe-Pomeroy, Inc. v. P&Z Co., 569 F.2d 1084, 1100 (gth Cir.
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a refusal to deal if the refusal is aimed at enhancing or acquiring
monopoly power, 3 but not if it is motivated by a legitimate business
purpose that encourages the improvement of a company's competitive
viability.' Thus, the reduction of costs and the improvement of
production or distribution efficiency 3l are legitimate business aims
that may justify a unilateral refusal to deal.37 In Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States,' for example, the only newspaper in Lorain, which
was read by ninety-nine percent of the families in town, refused to
accept advertisements from parties who also placed ads with a newly
established radio station. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's refusal was intended to eliminate the radio station as a
1978); United States v. Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conference, 439 F. Supp. 29,
37 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
33. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Local 1330, United
Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 835 (1976).
34. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Byars v. Bluff City News
Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). The absence of a legitimate business reason
for a refusal does not necessarily support an inference of specific intent to monopolize. See Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Nos. 78-1244, 78-1245 (6th Cir. Nov. 5,
1980); General Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1980).
35. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623-24
(1953). In Times-Picayune, defendant newspaper refused to sell ad space to buyers of
general display and classified advertising unless the ads appeared in both the morning and evening editions. This practice reduced printing costs. Defendant's contracts
for the sale of advertising were challenged as vehicles utilized in an attempt to monopolize a segment of interstate commerce in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conditions for obtaining advertising space
because they were predominantly motivated by legitimate business purposes, characteristic of industry practice, and without significant anticompetitive effect. Id. at 62427.
36. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp, 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). A company with monopoly power "is not
forbidden from improving [its] efficiency in manufacturing or marketing, even though
the effect of doing so will be to maintain or improve [its] sales." Id.
37. International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). The abandonment of an unprofitable business is a legitimate business reason for refusing to deal. Id. at 239-40. In Pacific
Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., [1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,991 (D.
Or. 1974), defendants independently refused to sell cigarettes to a plaintiff who
wanted to market them under the brand name Cancer "so as to encourage smokers
to stop smoking by calling attention to the health hazards" of their habit. Id. at
96,398. Defendants claimed that their individual refusals were based on the belief
that plaintiff's product would adversely affect the entire cigarette industry. The court
held that defendants' refusals were motivated by legitimate business concerns and
thus not violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 96,402.
38. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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competitorn for local advertising and, thereby, to gain a monopoly in
the local dissemination of news and advertising."0 The Supreme
Court held that the refusal to deal constituted an attempt to monopolize because the refusal was not predominantly motivated by legitimate business purposes.
In addition to specific intent, most courts require proof of dangerous probability of success as an element of an attempt to monopolize
claim." Dangerous probability of success may be shown when "the
means used, if not abated, are likely to move the defendant progresAn examination of dangerous probabilsively closer to monopoly." '
ity of success focuses on a defendant's market share both before and
after the challenged conduct has occurred'4 because the conduct's
"'restrictive effects will vary directly with the market power of the
firm involved."'" A predominant share of the market ordinarily implies monopoly power, 45 but need not do so. 8 Other structural characteristics of the industry in which a defendant is engaged are also
39. Id. at 153. Defendant's attempt to monopolize succeeded in depriving the
radio station of income without forcing it out of business. Id.
40. Id. at 154.
41. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
42. L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 51, at 137.
43. Hawk, supra note 29, at 1151.
44. Id. at 1154 (quoting Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 281, 314 (1956)). The dangerous probability requirement is a safeguard
against condemnation of conduct that is neither clearly harmful nor beneficial. Id. at
1155, 1174. Professor Sullivan has argued, however, that there is no reason "to hesitate to condemn conduct short of close probability of success on the ground that such
a rule would unduly discourage effective, though aggressive, competitive conduct. By
requiring (under the intent test) that the conduct be of a kind plainly threatening
competitive conditions, the rule already filters out any serious risk that desirable
conduct will be inhibited. Conduct which constitutes an attempt is predatory, coercive, or calculated to heighten entry barriers; there is nothing which should make us
hesitate to condemn it if the evidence leaves no doubt that the conduct has been
properly characterized." L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 51, at 138 (footnote omitted).
See generally American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946);
Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see International
Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1959); United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 425 (1956) (Warren, C.J., dissenting);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1946); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1, 10, 19 (9th Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 19 (1962); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
240 F.2d 643, 660 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); United States v.
Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd on other grounds,
343 U.S. 444 (1952); cf., Bendix Corp. v. Balax Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir.
1972) (31.2% market share held doubtful dangerous probability), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 819 (1973); Hiland Dairy Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968)
(dangerous probability not shown when defendant could obtain not more than 20% of
the market as a result of the challenged conduct), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
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considered. Barriers to entry4 7 that result from a defendant's conduct,
for example, may be evidence of monopoly power." Conversely, low
or no barriers to entry imply the absence of monopoly power."
Thus, "[o]nly a careful factual analysis of the market in question will
reveal whether monopoly power, in fact, exists."
In evaluating unilateral refusals to deal, 5' a few courts have adopted
a broader legal standard that proscribes some refusals even when
they do not manifest a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.5
These courts have held that a unilateral refusal to deal is unlawful if it
is an unreasonable restraint of trade, a restraint that is anticompetiOther measures of monopoly power include the Lerner index, which indicates the
departure of a company's price from its marginal cost. The Lerner index value for a
company in a perfectly competitive market is zero and is correspondingly higher
"[t]he more a firm's pricing decisions depart from the competitive norm." F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 50. The Herfindahl index, which correlates the number of sellers
in a market with each seller's market share, assigns values zero to one, one representing pure monopoly, to reflect the degree of concentration in the market. Id. at
51.
46. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 850-51 & n.19 (6th Cir. 1979).
47. An artificial barrier to entry is a practice of an existing company, such as
predatory pricing, that prevents new companies from entering a market. Natural
barriers to entry are basic market conditions, such as economies of large scale operation. See L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 23, at 77-79.
48. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,35-36 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977); FTC v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1354, 1357 (5th Cir. 1980); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603
F.2d 345, 352 (2d Cir. 1979); Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 596 F.2d 881,
885 (9th Cir. 1979); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. ICC, 580 F.2d 623, 630 (D.C. Cir.

1978).
49. Note, The Development of the Sherman Act Section 2 Market Share Test and
Its Inapplicability to Dynamic Markets, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 154, 182-86 (1975).
50. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 851 (6th Cir. 1979). "[M]arket
analysis has but one function-to help pinpoint the danger areas. This tool is not a
qualitative tool. It tells where one may expect a monopoly or a substantial lessening
of competition in a given line of commerce carried on in a given geographical area."
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (M.D. Fla. 1966),

aff'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 544 (1967).
51. General Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir.
1980); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1979); Tim
W. Koerner & Assocs. v. Aspen Labs Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D. Tex. 1980);
McDaniel v. General Motors Corp., 480 F. Supp. 666. 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Compare Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 839 (4th Cir. 1960)
(absent a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly or the existence of a conspiracy
or combination, a refusal to deal is lawful even if its underlying aims constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961) with Aladdin Oil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusal to deal is unlawful if it has any anticompetitive purpose or effect or if it creates or maintains a
monopoly) and Tim W. Koerner & Assocs., Inc. v. Aspen Labs Inc., 492 F. Supp.
294, 302 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (same) and McDaniel v. General Motors Corp., 480 F.
Supp. 666, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (same), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tive in purpose or effect.- This standard traditionally has been applied to concerted conduct alleged to violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' When it is applied to a unilateral refusal to deal, however, the
standard focuses on the net competitive impact of a single actor's conduct. If its purpose is not clear, or if its effects are varied, a refusal is
evaluated according to its net competitive effect.-" The refusal is condemned if it has an adverse effect, such as the maintenance of resale
prices or a significant restriction on entry, on competitive market
conditions.'
II. THE LEGALITY OF REFUSALS TO SELL
PRODUCTION

FACILMES: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS

To determine whether unilateral refusals to sell production facilities
affect competitive markets in a manner that is prohibited by section 2
of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to apply the foregoing legal standards and to examine certain relevant economic concepts. This analysis will indicate that a unilateral refusal to sell production facilities, by
itself, does not harm competition. Thus, regardless of whether courts
employ the Colgate standard or the broader restraint of trade standard, they will seldom, if ever, find a violation of section 2 in production facility cases.

53. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735-36 (9th
Cir. 1979). To prove an attempt to monopolize, for example, the Ninth Circuit requires a showing of "(1) only specific intent and (2) some illegal (under Section 1) or
predatory activity from which specific intent can be inferred." Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
54. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Foundation, 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 89
(1980); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 2942 (1980); Foster v. Maryland State Say. and Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare
Markets, Inc., 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of
Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439
F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 68, at 186-87.
55. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United
States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exch., 263 U.S. 611 (1924); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Cai-gill v. Board of Trade, 164 F.2d 820
(7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 880 (1948); L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 71, at
194-95.
56. See Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1979);
Tim W. Koerner & Assocs. v. Aspen Labs, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D. Tex.
1980); McDaniel v. General Motors Corp., 480 F. Supp. 666, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
aff'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980).
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A. Restraint of Trade
The restraint of trade standard is derived from the underlying purpose of the Sherman Act-the preservation of competitive markets
Thus, when emthrough the protection of the competitive process.'
ployed to evaluate the legality of unilateral refusals to sell production
facilities, the restraint of trade standard provides a method for determining whether the refusals unreasonably interfere with the competitive process.
Competition can be defined in terms of models that describe the
general structure of a relevant market. 9 The model of pure and perfect competition describes a competitive ideal. An industry is perfectly competitive if it is comprised of a large number of companies
producing a homogeneous product, each company having such a
small share of the market that it cannot significantly vary the price by
varying output.6" Perfectly competitive markets are also characterized by the presence of perfect knowledge of market conditions,
continuous divisibility of raw materials and final products, and the
absence of barriers to entry and exit.6 ' The model of perfect competition, however, does not accurately reflect the realities of the
American market economy. As one economist noted, " 'perfect com-

57. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688-89 (1978); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Byars v.
Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir. 1979); Comment, Draining the

Alcoa "Wishing Well": The Section 2 Conduct Requirement After Kodak and Calcomp, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 291, 297 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Section 2 Conduct
Requirement]. "Competition should be considered not just a narrow term of law nor
just a part of the logic of economics but as a social mechanism, as a device for
administering society's economic activities to achieve economic and social and polit-

ical objectives." Bernhard, Divergent Concepts of Competition in Antitrust Cases, 15
Antitrust Bull. 43, 68 (1970).
58. See generally Bernhard, supra note 57, at 44.
59. Structural characteristics of a market include the number of buyers and sellers, product differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structures, vertical integration,
and the number of conglomerate firms. F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 4-5. Performance, which is evaluated in terms of production and allocative efficiency, progress,
full employment, and equity, is affected by the conduct of sellers and buyers. Id. at
3-4. Conduct comprises "the choices the firm makes among alternative possible responses to the conditions which it faces, its tactics as it strives in the market to
achieve its goals." L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 6, at 23. An evaluation of conduct
involves the examination of pricing behavior, product strategy, research and innovation, and legal tactics. F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 5. Market conduct is largely
determined by market structure. Id. at 4. This Note confines the discussion of competition primarily to the structural characteristics of competitive markets. The competitive impact of refusals to sell production facilities will be examined in terms of
structural characteristics of the relevant market before and after the refusal.
60. A. Austin, Antitrust: Law, Economics, Policy § 1.4 (1976); F. Scherer, supra
note 7, at 9-10.
61. See note 60 supra.
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petition' does not and cannot exist and has presumably never
existed." 2 Nevertheless, the theory's importance rests on its underlying goals. In a competitive market, no one company or group of
companies should exercise significant control over price,O the quantity of products supplied should reflect the demands of consumers,"
and the interaction of product supply and consumer demand in the
market should determine the product's price.4
Dissatisfaction with the model of perfect competition led to the
formulation of new competitive models. To reconcile the goals underlying the perfectly competitive model with real-world conditions, the
new models suggest criteria for determining whether industries are
workably competitive. 6 To be workably competitive, a market
should have at least as many companies as are warranted by scale
economies. 67 Although sellers need not be so numerous as to be devoid of market power, customers should have a variety of suppliers
from which to choose. 6' Furthermore, there should be no artificial
barriers to mobility or entry.' The existence of these market conditions indicates that resources are being allocated efficiently.
62. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 241,
241 (1940).
63. F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 11-19; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, §§ 5-6, at
20-24.
64. See L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 6, at 22-23.
65. Bernhard, supra note 57, at 75.
66. See F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 36-37.
67. "Fewness is not necessarily noncompetitive.... The key condition is not
large numbers but independence; although large numbers are not necessary for independence, they nearly always suffice." Economic Concentration: Hearings on Economic Concentration before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1964) (statement of Morris A.
Adelman).
68. See Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 349, 356 (1950).
69. See F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 37. Professor Markham has proposed a definition of workable competition in terms of dynamic market conditions. "An industry
may be judged to be workably competitive when, after the structural characteristics
of its market and the dynamic forces that shaped them have thoroughly been examined, there is no clearly indicated change that can be effected through public
policy measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses." Markham, supra note 68, at 361.
70. D. Needham, supra note 7, at 138; F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 18. The
efficient allocation of resources is an important benefit derived from, as well as a way
of obtaining, competitive markets. Id. at 9, 18. Other benefits of competition include
maximum production efficiency, relatively low prices and costs, and a decentralization of power. Id. at 11-13. Adam Smith posited that, notwithstanding short run
aberrations from competition, competitive markets can be attained as long as resources move from industries in which their returns are low to those in which their
returns are high. The long run mobility of resources requires an absence of artificial
barriers to resource transfers. See A. Smith, supra note 7, at 99, 125-26, 134; L.
Weiss, supra note 7, at 10.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Restraint of trade analysis examines the degree of competition
within the market in question prior to the refusal. If there are a sufficiently large number of sellers and low barriers to entry, the refusal
will have a negligible impact on competitive conditions. 7" Easy entry
will ensure that the market remains competitive."2 Thus, when a
company that operates in a workably competitive market refuses to
sell its production facilities to a potential entrant, competitive pressures from other existing companies, as well as opportunities for de
novo entry, prevent the refusal from having an unreasonably anticompetitive effect, regardless of whether the company that is the object of the refusal ever enters the market. 73

Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel

Corp.74 illustrates that a refusal to sell production facilities does not,
by itself, have an anticompetitive effect on the market in which the
refusing company operates. United States Steel Corporation (USS)

71. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974); FTC
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1964); F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 37; L. Sullivan, supra note
1, § 205, at 633; Markham, supra note 68, at 356.
72. L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 23, at 77-79; set! United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964).
73. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974); FTC
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1964); F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 37; L. Sullivan, supra note
1, § 205, at 633; Markham, supra note 68, at 356.
74. 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim
on the ground that it was not ripe for adjudication. The court reasoned that no
binding offer to purchase the Youngstown plants had been submitted to United
States Steel (USS). Id. at 1282. The district court's judgment on the antitrust claim
was vacated and remanded by the Sixth Circuit for briefing and argument on tile
merits. The two issues on remand were whether there had been "a flat refusal to
deal with plaintiffs on the basis alleged," and if so, did that refusal constitute an
antitrust violation. Id. at 1283. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under federal labor law, contract law, and property law. Id. In
addressing the question of the legality of USS' refusal to sell its plants to the plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit failed to distinguish between refusals to sell production facilities and refusals to sell goods. The court stated that "[tihe ramifications of [USS']
refusal would be far-reaching. Could United States Steel, in the event the Chrysler
Corporation sought to manufacture some portion of its own steel needs, refuse to sell
steel to that corporation because of the massive aid which the federal government
has seen fit to supply to Chrysler?" Id. (footnote omitted). USS could refuse to
supply steel to Chrysler absent a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. See note
2 supra and accompanying text. The court's question, however, fails to recognize the
different economic harms created by a refusal to sell production facilities and a refusal to sell goods and services. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text. On
remand, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue. Williams v. United States Steel Corp., No. 79-2337 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1980).
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announced the closing of two steel mills located in Youngstown, Ohio
because they were unprofitable and "could not be made otherwise
due to obsolescence and change in technology, markets, and
transportation." '
The Steelworkers, former employees of the plants,
expressed an interest in purchasing and operating the steel mills.-6
The Steelworkers formed the Community Steel Corporation and
hoped to obtain the capital necessary to acquire the Youngstown mills
through a federally guaranteed loan.' After USS rejected the Steelworkers' purchase proposal, stating that it would not sell to a government subsidized competitor,m the Steelworkers claimed that USS
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.'
Under the restraint of trade analysis, USS' refusal could not have
violated section 2. Market share statistics reveal the existence of
workable competition within the American steel industry.0 Concentration within the industry has declined over time,"I and the number
of steel companies has increased steadily.Y2 Consequently, USS'
share of the market has diminished." This steady erosion of the market shares of the dominant companies in the industry reflects low

75. 631 F.2d at 1266. For a discussion of how unions may help to cause this
result, see Medoff, Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 380 (1979).
76. Brief of the Appellants at 9, Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
77. Reply Brief of the Appellants at 15-16, Local 1330, United Steel Workers v.
United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
78. Sease, Closing of a Steel Mill Hits Workcrs in U.S. With Little Warning,
Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1980, at 20, col. 2; Brief of the Appellants at 9, Local 1330,
United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
On remand before the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, USS claimed
that its stated policy had been that the mills "'would not be sold as operating units to
anyone because of their condition." Trial Brief of Defendant at 4, Williams v. United
States Steel Corp., No. 79-2337 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1980).
79. Brief of the Appellants at 33-38, Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United
States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
80. See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on the United States Steel Industry and Its International Rivals: Trends and Factors Determining International
Competitiveness 41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC Report]. The American steel
industry comprised 5% of American manufacturing income in 1972. Id.
81. The four-firm concentration ratio is the market share of the four largest firms
in the industry. L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 6-8. Thus, an industry is deemed to be
an oligopoly, a few sellers, each with substantial monopoly power, F. Scherer, supra
note 7, at 10, when its four-firm concentration ratio exceeds 507. L. Weiss, supra
note 7, at 6-8. The concentration ratio for the steel industr', based on physical units
of production and shipments, declined from 64.7% in 1942 to 52.8% in 1976. FTC
Report, supra note 80, at 53. Based on the value of shipments in 1972, the four-firm
concentration ratio was 45%, just slightly higher than U.S. manufacturing generally.
Id. at 44.
82. The number of companies increased from 148 in 1958 to 241 in 1972. Id.
83. Id. at 169.
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natural and artificial barriers to entry." To the extent entry has been
limited, that limitation is primarily attributable to natural barriers
such as the steel industry's relatively low levels of profitability, and
the relatively large size of capital investment required to establish a
firm of minimum optimal size." Profits in steel have been consistently below the average for all manufacturing industries.' The barrier created by the large absolute cost of entry, however, has been
eroded by the emergence of small steel mills or minimills,81 which
require lower capital investment than larger mills.' s
The influx of relatively low priced steel imports provides further
evidence of the absence of substantial entry barriers.89 Although
domestic consumption of foreign steel is limited by a governmentcreated barrier to entry, the trigger or reference price system,"
Japanese producers had been able to offer most steel products at
84. See F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 231-32.
85. Id. at 232 n.62; L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 202. Another barrier to entry is
the concentrated control over iron ore resources. This barrier has been lowered by
the growing international market in ore. Id. at 166.
86. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 67; Kiers, Putting Steel Into America's Share
of World Markets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1979, § A, at 31, col. 5. USS announced a
loss of $561.7 million for the fourth quarter of 1979. Salpukas, U.S. Steel Has a
Record Loss, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1980, § D, at 4, col. 3. Persistently low profits
indicate that resources are not being allocated efficiently. L. Weiss, supra note 7, at
11. One consequence of the poor return on investment in steel production has been
the diversification of many American steel producers into other industries. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 64. USS, for example, now operates in such other industries
as cement, real estate development, coal and chemicals, and steel structure building.
Id. Non-steel operations comprised 86% of USS' operating income in 1978. N.Y.
Times, March 15, 1979, § D, at 4, col. 2.
87. Minimills are relatively inexpensive electric are furnaces that convert steel
scrap into steel products. Minimill production has increased in absolute and relative
terms. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 28. See generally Feder, Iron Reduction in
Steelmaking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1980, § D, at 2, col. 1.
88. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 28; L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 161 n.3.
89. See American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report 8 (1979);
FTC Report, supra note 80, at 69. As a percentage of domestic shipments, imports
have ranged between 14% and 18% since 1976. Id. Imports constituted 16.8% of
domestic shipments during the first eight months of 1980. American Iron and Steel
Institute, Apparent Supply of Steel Mill Products (Net Tons) Year 1980, at 2 (1980).
90. In February 1978, in response to the complaints of American steel producers,
the Secretary of the Treasury announced a system of "trigger prices" based on
Japanese costs for steel production and transportation. Under this system, if any foreign steel producer attempts to sell steel products in the United States below the
established trigger price, an investigation follows. If the government investigation
reveals that the foreign producer is selling steel in the United States at prices below
the producer's costs, a penalty of increased duties is imposed. L. Weiss, supra note
7, at 211-12. Although trigger pricing was suspended from March to October of 1980,
the system is currently in effect and prices vary according to the cost of Japanese
steel products. Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1981, at 8, col. 2. Until 1962, USS initiated all
of the price changes in the steel industry. After 1962, when other price leaders
appeared, USS began to give secret discounts on announced list prices. Discounting
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prices ten to twenty percent below those of American producers., '
Because of recent increases in the trigger price and tariffs, however,
Americans currently pay more for Japanese steel than for American
steel.92 Nevertheless, the Japanese possess large advantages in the
cost per ton of producing steel." These lower production costs'"
should result in an increase in the domestic consumption of imported
steel, creating further competitive pressures on domestic producers.
Finally, USS' refusal does not necessarily preclude the Steelworkers' entry." If a government guaranteed loan had been available for
by small domestic steel companies and foreign steel producers prevented any one
price leader from raising prices significantly above competitive levels. This change in
pricing practices indicated that the industry was becoming more competitive. FTC
Report, supra note 80, at 159-61; F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 167-69. Some American producers contended that low import prices were the result of cyclical dumping,
L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 210, the pricing of exports below domestic levels during
recessions when domestic demand is low. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 228.
Dumping may be defined as exporting at prices below the costs of production. L.
Weiss, supra note 7, at 211. In practice, the foreign cost of production is "a constructed value of average cost based on the direct cost per unit (materials, energy,
and labor) plus a minimum of 10% of direct cost for overhead expense and a minimum of 8% of direct cost plus overhead for profits." Id. (footnote omitted). Trigger
prices are based on this cost. Id. at 211-12. The trigger pricing system has been
described as a "deal" between the Carter Administration and American steel producers to prevent the latter from initiating antidumping suits against our European allies
and alienating them in the process. Big Steel's Bluff-and Problem, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1980, § A, at 18, col. 1. It is estimated that, at prevailing price and consumption levels, trigger prices impose an additional cost on American steel consumers of about $1 billion annually. There was an additional, estimated $177 million lost
because of the misallocation of resources resulting from the reference price system.
FTC Report, supra note 80, at 557. Furthermore, the reference price system may
have adversely affected the international competitive position of all products composed of steel. Silk, Inflation, Trade Protectionism and Rising Steel Prices, N.Y.
Times, May 11, 1978, § D, at 5, col. 1.
91. See Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1981, at 8, col. 2. See also Council on Wage and
Price Stability, Prices and Costs in the United States Steel Industry xvi (1977)
[hereinafter cited as COWPS Report]; L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 212-13.
92. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1981, § 3, at 18, col. 3.
93. COWPS Report, supra note 91, at xvi. According to one estimate, foreign
steel is now 5% more expensive than domestic steel because of increased trigger
prices and transportation and tariff costs borne by steel imports. N.Y. Times, Feb.
22, 1981, § 3, at 18, col. 3. Prior to the recently announced trigger price increase,
however, Japanese total steel production costs were estimated to be 15% to 20%
below those of American producers. COWPS Report, supra note 91, at xvi. Although
trigger prices are to rise 4.4%, Japanese unit production costs have risen only 2%.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1981, § 3, at 18, col. 3. The Japanese, therefore, still have a
cost advantage that is masked by two inflationary, protectionist devices-trigger
prices and tariffs.
94. The cost advantages are primarily attributable to the lower relative cost of
Japanese labor. COWPS Report, supra note 91, at xv. The higher productivity of
Japanese labor accounts primarily for its relatively lower cost. Id. at 43-46; L. Weiss,
supra note 7, at 212.
95. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), Bethlehem Steel argued that it could not operate in the Chicago area unless it
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the purchase of the Youngstown plants, it probably would have been
available for the purchase of alternative plants of equivalent costwhether already existing or newly constructed facilities.,
Although USS' refusal did not have an anticompetitive effect, it is
less clear that the refusal did not have an anticompetitive purpose.
USS announced that it would not sell its mills to any government
subsidized competitors.97 This stated reason for not selling to the
Steelworkers may suggest discrimination. It does not necessarily imply, however, that USS intended to foreclose completely the Steelworkers' entry into the market or to distort or destroy competition.'
Indeed, USS could not distort or destroy competition in the steel
industry by a refusal to sell its facilities." Thus, USS' actual purpose
for refusing to sell should not affect the conclusion as to the refusal's
legality.
Restraint of trade analysis changes when the industry in question
does not appear to be workably competitive. When entry is impossible except through the purchase of existing production facilities, the
propriety of a refusal to sell such facilities can be determined only by
identifying the source of the entry barriers. It is important to discover whether barriers to de novo entry are primarily attributable to
practices of the defendant apart from its refusal,'00 or to natural conditions of a particular market, such as economies of scale.101 Only
artificial barriers, those erected by a defendant's conduct, are subject
to condemnation under the antitrust laws.102
acquired the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company. After the merger was denied,
Bethlehem constructed a new plant at Burns Harbor, Indiana, FTC Report, supra
note 80, at 59. See generally Barber, supra note 1, at 871.
96. Another steel company has received government-backed financial assistance
at its inception. L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 201.
97. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
98. See International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231, 243
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
99. See notes 80-96 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178. 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1968);
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964); Carr Elecs. Corp. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 472 F. Supp. 9, 11 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
101. See Brozen, Competition, Efficiency, and Antitrust, in The Competitive
Economy 8-11 (1975). Professor Brozen argues that the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department should confine its activities to the removal of artificial barriers to
entry. There would be no need, therefore, to attempt to break up highly concentrated industries or to become entangled in questions of what constitutes the relevant
market. Id. at 8.
102. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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A potential competitor that faces substantial natural barriers to entry is precluded from entering the market even when existing production facilities are not available for sale."' In this situation, the
harm to a potential competitor of a refusal to sell production facilities
is no different from the "harm" inflicted by the natural entry
barriers.'
It is necessary, therefore, to draw a distinction between
harm to competitors and harm to competition that may result from a
refusal to sell production facilities, especially in a market characterized by natural barriers to entry. s Only harm to competition is
actionable under the Sherman Act."
Judicial interference with a
legitimate business decision to abandon production facilities merely
because another company would be adversely affected is "an intolerable application of the Sherman Act" 10. that infringes on the right of
businesses to decide independently with whom they will deal,"' and
that may also constitute a barrier to the transferability of resources to
their most productive uses."

The failure to determine the source of entry barriers as well as the
failure to apprehend fully the distinction between harm to competitors and harm to competition led the Ninth Circuit to a questionable
conclusion in Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co."' In
103. See note 47 supra.
104. The harm inflicted by a refusal to sell production facilities is incidental to a
lawful, independent exercise of business discretion that is not actionable under the
Sherman Act. See International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co.. 532 F.2d
231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). The harm that results from the

existence of natural entry barriers is not the product of anticompetitive conduct and
thus is also not actionable. See notes 101-02 supra.
105. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir.
1972); Raitport v. General Motors Corp., 450 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Unibrand Tire & Prod. Co. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429 F. Supp. 470, 474
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293, 298
(E.D. Ill.
1968).
106. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. The antitrust laws protect "competition, not competitors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962). "In the absence of a per se violation the Sherman Act protects the individual
injured competitor and affords him relief, but only under circumstances where there
is such general injury to the competitive process that the public at large suffers
economic harm." Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d
196, 200 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 656 (1961); see Knutson v.
Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 1976); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp.,
460 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir. 1972); Unibrand Tire & Prod. Co. v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 429 F. Supp. 470, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller
Co., 289 F. Supp. 293, 298 (E.D. Ill. 1968).
107. International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231, 241 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
108. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Salpukas, The Turnaroundat U.S. Steel, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1981, §
D, at 1, col. 3; note 70 supra and accompanying text.
110. 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Helix, the plaintiff operated a flour and millfeed mill that was destroyed by fire. Helix alleged that it could remain in the milling business only through the acquisition of an existing mill in the Pacific
Northwest. It claimed that the cost of constructing a new mill would
be prohibitive given its expected profitability. Helix, therefore,
offered to purchase defendant General Foods' mill, which was being
sold because it had become unprofitable to operate. General Foods
rejected Helix's offer and sold its mill to another competitor, Terminal Flour Mills. Helix claimed that the sale of General's mill to Terminal constituted a contract in restraint of trade in violation of section
I of the Sherman Act"' because it excluded Helix from the market."'
Without examining the net competitive impact of the sale, the
court held that "the exclusion of a [competitor] collaborative action,
[the sale of the mill,] having the necessary effect of restraining trade
would violate the Sherman Act." "3 The Ninth Circuit cited Albrecht
v. Herald Co." 4 to support its contention that any agreement that
adversely affects a competitor is an unlawful combination in restraint
of trade."' Albrecht, however, stands for no such proposition. In
Albrecht, the defendant went beyond a simple refusal to deal and
employed another party to coerce the plaintiff into complying with its
resale prices. The arrangement in Albrecht had the specific anticompetitive purpose of maintaining resale prices and, thus, was held an
unlawful combination in restraint of trade."' In Helix, however, the
111. Id. at 1319-20.
112. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were two of the five remaining competitors in the Pacific Northwest flour and millfeed market. Terminal and General had
market shares of 19.6% and 10.3%, respectively. Helix also alleged that sales to the
Defense Supply Agency constituted a submarket of which Helix had 56% before the
destruction of its mill. Subsequently, General acquired 8% and Terminal acquired
64%. Id. at 1319 n.1. Despite Helix's assertion to the contrary, the Defense Supply
Agency cannot be characterized as a submarket. Markets are defined by product
characteristics and geographic location, not by customer, unless the product is
altered in some manner for a distinct class of customers. See Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); West Texas Utils. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv.
Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 820 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
113. 523 F.2d at 1322. The court held that "there was evidence which, interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would support a finding of a contract or combination to restrain trade." Id.
114. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
115. 523 F.2d at 1322. Not every contract that incidentally inflicts some harm
upon a competitor is an unreasonable restraint of trade within the meaning of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. "If defendants did conspire to drive [plaintiff) out of business, then
a combination in restraint of trade existed which fits within the plain words of the
statute." Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1978);
see Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1978); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Bay CityAbrahams Bros. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
116. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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agreement should not have been considered to be collaborative action
in violation of the Sherman Act. Because only one mill was available
for sale and two parties wanted to purchase it, harm to one party
was inevitable and incidental to the transaction." 7 There was no evidence that General's refusal to sell to Helix and its subsequent sale to
Terminal had the purpose or effect of excluding Helix from the milling market or had a substantial anticompetitive effect on that market.
Helix's plight was the result of the concurrence of two fortuitous

events: the destruction of its mill by fire and the failure of General's
mill to generate sufficient profits. Had neither event occurred, Helix
would not have asserted an antitrust claim. Neither event is even
remotely related to the type of anticompetitive conduct the antitrust
laws have traditionally condemned. A finding of an antitrust violation
under these circumstances would mean that every company that contemplates a sale of its production facilities must sell to a potential
competitor to avoid antitrust liability, regardless of the dictates of its
own business judgment. This result defies common sense, logic, and
the principle expressed in Colgate,"' which allows a person engaged
in business to exercise his own discretion regarding with whom he
will deal. Helix's self-serving claim that it had no alternative means of
re-entry should not have been determinative."" Helix obviously did
117. Contracts, such as the one entered into in Helix, "do not involve combining
for the primary purpose of coercing or excluding; rather they involve combinations of
two or more persons to further directly the business of the parties to the agreement,
and the effect on third parties and on competition is indirect. The issue in these
cases is... whether the purpose and effect of the operation of the contract... was
such as unreasonably to exclude outsiders from participation in the trade in question." Barber, supra note 1, at 877. In General Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co.,
625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1980), Exxon sold all of its polyethylene scrap to General
throughout the early 1970's. In the first quarter of 1976, Exxon sold more scrap to
Bamberger Compounds Corporation than to General, even though the latter submitted a higher bid. Id. at 1232. General brought an action against Exxon and Bamberger, claiming that the two companies conspired to exclude General from the scrap
market in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that Exxon's sale of the scrap to Bamberger at a price lower than that bid by General did
not constitute sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to eliminate competition. Id. at
1233-34. General and Helix are analogous because both cases involve a refusal to sell
to one party accompanied by a contract for sale to another party. General, however,
stands for the correct proposition that such a contract standing alone, without further
evidence of an anticompetitive purpose or effect, is not a restraint of trade within the
meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
118. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
119. See note 95 supra. Apparently this is the very trap that the Ninth Circuit fell
into. The court held that "[a] jury could find.. . an unreasonable restraint of trade
as a necessary consequence of the fact that Helix would have purchased the mill but
for General's decision to sell it to Terminal, and that defendants' course of action
would necessarily exclude competition from the market because of the closed nature
of the market." 523 F.2d at 1320-21. The court, however, did not define the term
"closed market," nor did it recognize the need to determine whether the "closed
nature of the market" was attributable to perfectly legal, natural entry barriers that
would have precluded entry under any circumstances.
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not find its de novo entry into the market so costly as to be unprofitable. In any industry, the average rate of return, subject to a risk
premium, will determine whether entry will take place.'
Presumably, if Helix were earning normal profits prior to the destruction of
its mill, and normal profits were anticipated in the long run, Helix
would have considered investment in a new mill desirable.'
If profits were expected to be below normal, then Helix or any other potential entrant would find entry undesirable and seek a more profitable
employment for its capital. Thus, assuming that Helix could re-enter
only through the purchase of an existing mill, General's refusal to sell
should be deemed a Sherman Act violation only if General had raised
artificial barriers, apart from its refusal, that prevented Helix's reentry. Otherwise, the situation is merely the lawful one in which a
seller has exercised his legitimate business right to dispose of his
property as he wishes, and natural barriers militate against a potential
competitor's entry.
Restraint of trade analysis is a means of identifying those refusals to
sell production facilities that have an anticompetitive purpose or
effect, but do not constitute acts of monopolization or attempts to
monopolize.'2 The latter standard is narrower and, therefore, more
difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy.'2 Refusals to sell production facilities,
however, seldom amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade because a refusal rarely raises significant barriers to entry.2 4 The
purchase of existing production facilities, if available, is one of a number of entry options in a market lacking substantial artificial or natural
entry barriers. "" A plaintiff, therefore, will be even less likely to
prevail on a claim that a refusal is an act of monopolization or an
attempt to monopolize.
B. Purpose to Create or Maintain a Monopoly
Analysis of refusals to sell production facilities according to the
dicta in Colgate focuses upon conduct to determine whether there is
an intent to create or maintain a monopoly.1-' A refusal may indicate
120. FTC Report, supra note 80, at 547; see L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 6, at 22.
121. See L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 202.
122. See Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1979);
Tim W. Koerner & Assocs. v. Aspen Labs, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D. Tex.
1980); McDaniel v. General Motors Corp., 480 F. Supp. 666, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. See note 52 supra.
124. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 17-31 supra and accompanying text. Although courts require a
showing of general intent to monopolize to prove actual monopolization, see note 20
supra, "cases discussing a monopolist's duty to deal have effectively required a finding of specific intent to monopolize." Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843,
859 (6th Cir. 1979).
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such an intention if it is part of an unlawful course of conduct calculated to distort or destroy competition,' r or if it can be characterized
as "'bold, relentless, and predatory.' "'1s
Actual monopolization cannot be inferred from a monopolist's refusal to sell production facilities because production facilities are abandoned when they become unprofitable.'
The closing of unprofitable
or obsolescent plants is necessary to make a company's operations
more efficient and more profitable.'
By contrast, companies that
refuse to sell goods and services do not always have a legitimate business purpose for the refusal.'
Thus, it is possible, especially when
the refusing company operates in two related markets, to infer that a
company's refusal to sell goods or services, by itself, is aimed at
creating or maintaining a monopoly.
A recent case supports the contention that a refusal to sell production facilities does not constitute an act of monopolization. In International Railways of Central America v. United Brands Co.,"-' plaintiff
claimed that United Brands' abandonment of and refusal to sell its
banana plantations caused the railroad to lose profits and, thus,
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.1in Specifically, plaintiff
127. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 132-37 (1955); see Unibrand Tire & Prod. Co. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429
F. Supp. 470, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
128. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951) (citation omitted).
129. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Byars v. Bluff City News
Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.,
567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); International Rys. of
Cent. Am. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964).
130. See Salpukas, supra note 109, at 1.
131. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); see note 2 supra.
132. 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
133. Id. at 239. Plaintiff's § 1 claim was premised on the theory that the refusal to
sell the plantations was the result of a conspiracy or combination between United
Brands and its subsidiary CAG, rendering the refusal a per se illegal group boycott.
Id. at 240; see note 1 supra. The court assumed, without deciding, that an intracorporate conspiracy between United Brands and CAG did exist. 532 F.2d at 240.
United Brands argued that Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951), which announced the "'intracorporate conspiracy- doctrine, only
condemned anticompetitive agreements "between two commonly owned enterprises
which were held out to be and were in fact competitors.- 532 F.2d at 240. United
Brands' action was in essence unilateral because it only dealt with International Railways through United Brand's subsidiary, CAG. Id.. The court, however, rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the concerted refusal to deal %%-as per se illegal even if it
appeared reasonable under the circumstances. The court distinguished United
Brands' refusal from joint boycott cases in which a per se rule had been applied. The
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alleged that the refusal was an abuse of United Brands' monopoly
power and, thus, an act of monopolization. 31 The Second Circuit
rejected plaintiff's section 2 claim on the ground that United Brands
neither had, nor exercised monopoly power. The court noted that the
absence of such power was demonstrated by the decline in United
Brands' profits over a ten year period and by United Brands' inability
to obtain low freight rates from plaintiff.;
As to the exercise of
monopoly power, the court held that United Brands "had no reasonable business alternative but to abandon an unprofitable and uncomfortable operation. This cannot possibly be characterized as an act of
monopolization, which is the exercise of a power to fix prices or to
exclude competition."'
The legitimate business purpose for refusing to sell production facilities also negates allegations of specific intent to monopolize in
attempted monopolization actions. 37 Furthermore, a refusal to sell
production facilities does not constitute an attempt to monopolize because such a refusal, by itself, will not provide a defendant with a
dangerous probability of success.-1 The presence of rival companies
latter condemned concerted refusals aimed solely at the elimination of competition.
Id. at 241. The court specifically referred to Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), in which the defendants, manufacturers and designers of
original textiles and women's dresses, agreed to refuse to sell to retailers who stocked
relatively inexpensive copies manufactured by the so-called "style pirates." In that
case, the Supreme Court held that "the aim of petitioners' combination was the
intentional destruction of one type of manufacture and sale which competed with
Guild members. The purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its
tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did practice upon a rival method of
competition, all brought it within the policy of the prohibition declared by the Sherman and Clayton Acts." 312 U.S. at 467-68. United Brands, however, had legitimate
business reasons for abandoning its plantations. 532 F.2d at 241. United Brands'
plantations were the targets of Panama disease and excessive "blowdowns" that destroyed large portions of the plantations, rendering them unsuitable for the cultivation of bananas. Id. at 237. Furthermore, United Brands' refusal to sell, by itself,
was not "indicative of an interest to prevent competitors from entering the field." Id.
at 243.
134. Id. To establish unlawful monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must prove the defendant's possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and the defendant's "willful acquisition or maintenance of that power."
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). International Railways
claimed that United Brands violated § 2 of the Sherman Act "no matter how legitimate its reasons for giving up the Tiquisate operation." 532 F.2d at 239.
135. 532 F.2d at 240. The Second Circuit assumed that the relevant market was
the "'importation of bananas into the United States solely from Guatemala.' " id. at
240 n.18.
136. Id. at 239; see P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law, 736e, at 274 (1978)
("It requires a long stretch to call an individual refusal to deal 'monopolizing' when it
does nothing to increase the refuser's monopoly power and nothing to increase his
position in any market").
137. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
138. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); FTC v.
Proctor & Gamble Co.. 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,
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and opportunities for de novo entry prevent a refusing company from
significantly increasing its market share merely by refusing to sell its
production facilities. 13 In the United Steel Workers case,"4 for example, even if United States Steel's refusal precluded the Steelworkers'
entry, USS could not monopolize the American steel market given
the existence of vigorous competition from foreign and domestic producers.
Thus, a refusal to sell production facilities will rarely constitute
actual monopolization or an attempt to monopolize under the Colgate
standard. Unless there is additional anticompetitive conduct, a company's refusal will not rise to the level of conduct proscribed by the
Sherman Act.
C. Policy Considerations: The Theory of Comparative Advantage
The foregoing analysis indicates that defendants should not incur
liability for a unilateral refusal to sell production facilities in most
cases. This result is especially appropriate when unprofitable or
obsolescent facilities are abandoned in a domestic industry that cannot compete effectively with foreign producers. Condemnation of the
refusal and enforcement of a sale may have the long term, adverse
effect of significantly distorting the allocation of resources within a
given industry as well as the entire economy. Because competitive
markets may be maintained by ensuring that resources are free to
move to their most productive uses,' the goal of preserving competitive markets will be frustrated if courts prevent companies from
transferring obsolescent production facilities to more profitable uses.
Thus, the long term policy of preserving competitive markets"4 by
promoting allocative efficiency"I may require judicial sanction of refusals that might otherwise be condemned after applying the short
term evaluative criteria utilized under the Colgate and restraint of
trade standards.
378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
F. Scherer, supra note 7, at 37; L. Sullivan, supra note 1, § 205, at 633; Markham,
supra note 68, at 356.
139. See note 138 supra.
140. The Steelworkers claimed that USS' refusal to deal constituted an attempt to
monopolize in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, because it was an "[exercise of]
,monopoly power' for the purpose of preventing a potential competitor from entering
the steel market." Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir. 1980).
141. See A. Smith, supra note 7, at 99, 125-26, 134; L. Weiss, supra note 7, at
10.
142. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688-89 (1978); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4 (1958); Byars v.
Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir. 1979); Section 2 Conduct Requirement, supra note 57, at 297.
143. See Brozen, supra note 101, at 8-11.
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The theory of comparative advantage or comparative cost is a useful
model for identifying the situations in which allocative efficiency justifies a refusal to sell production facilities. The theory prescribes the
manner in which resources should be allocated to promote international trade and to capture the gains from such trade.'"I The basic
premise of this theory is that nations should produce commodities
whose relative costs are lower than those of a comparable foreign
industry.'
Prices at home and abroad will then determine the
amount and type of commodities produced for trade.'
By improving
the efficiency of resource utilization, trade will raise the real income
of all trading nations. 47 To promote allocative efficiency, nations
should contract industries that lack comparative advantage and transfer resources to growing industries that possess it. 48 Policies that
impede this transfer result in allocative inefficiency and loss of income to the world community.'49 Thus, resources are misallocated
when a refusal to sell production facilities is enjoined in a domestic
industry in which costs are higher than those of a comparable foreign
industry. w
The American steel industry, for example, lacks comparative
advantage.'
Steel production costs in Japan, the world's most efficient steel producer, are fifteen to twenty percent below those in the
United States.12 The theory of comparative advantage indicates that
domestic and world income can be raised by contracting the resources devoted to the domestic production of steel and by increasing
domestic consumption of Japanese steel." Requiring USS to sell its
plants would thwart the goal of allocating resources to those industries that enjoy a comparative advantage.
The policy implication of the theory of comparative advantage for
refusals to sell production facilities is clear. A company's right of refusal should be upheld in an industry that lacks comparative advantage, even when the refusal enhances artificial entry barriers.', This
policy prescription is grounded in the normative judgment that antitrust enforcement resources should be used to police viable

144. M. Kreinin, International Economics: A Policy Approach 217-18 (2d ed.
1975).
145. Id. at 237.
146. Id. at 217-18.
147. Id. at 237.
148. Id. at 238; see L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 212-13; When Giant Industries
Falter, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1979, § A, at 24, col. 1.
149. M. Kreinin, supra note 144, at 238.
150. Id. at 237.

151. L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 213.
152. See notes 91-93 Tupra and accompanying text.
153. L. Weiss, supra note 7, at 216; see note 148 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 141-43 supra and accompanying text.
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industries ' and is justified by the gains to the economy from improved allocative efficiency.
CONCLUSION

A unilateral refusal to sell production facilities should generally not
be deemed a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Absent a
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the courts should not interfere with a business' decision concerning the disposal of its property. Because the question whether a company will sell its production
facilities arises only after it decides to abandon unprofitable operations, it is unlikely that a refusal to sell indicates a specific intent to
monopolize. Furthermore, the transfer of resources out of unproductive uses and into more productive ones is a manifestation of the
operation of competitive markets. Enforcement of the antitrust laws
should not "shake" the invisible hand '-" and thereby promote allocative inefficiency.
Once a company decides to close one of its facilities, it should be
entitled to dispose of the property as it wishes. Assuming that the
industry of which it is a part does not lack comparative advantage, a
company should be required to sell an abandoned facility to a potential competitor only when the refusal is part of a course of conduct
calculated to distort or destroy competition and when no alternative
means of entry are feasible. The foregoing conditions for a judicially
enforced sale will probably be present only when a defendant has
erected artificial barriers to entry apart from a refusal to sell its production facilities.
Seth Schwartz
155. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504 (1974);
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